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Abstract
In the literature of game theory, the information sets of extensive form games have different inter-
pretations, which may lead to confusions and paradoxical cases. We argue that the problem lies in the
mix-up of two interpretations of the extensive form game structures: game rules or game runs which
do not always coincide. In this paper, we try to separate and connect these two views by proposing a
dynamic epistemic framework in which we can compute the runs step by step from the game rules plus
the given assumptions of the players. We propose a modal logic to describe players’ knowledge and
its change during the plays, and provide a complete axiomatization. We also show that, under certain
conditions, the mix-up of the rules and the runs is not harmful due to the structural similarity of the
two.
1 Introduction
1.1 Interpretations of information sets
Game theory studies strategic interactions between rational players in the setting of games (cf. e.g.,
Osbourne and Rubinstein (1994) for the basics). When the sequential structure of players’ choices is
important, games are usually represented in extensive forms, e.g., the tree-like structure of Game 1 below,
which denotes a game where player 1 starts by choosing action a or action b followed by player 2’s turn
to choose between c and d. Depending on their choices, the game may end up with different outcomes in
favor of player 1 or 2.
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Game 2
There can be two views regarding such a tree-like structure:
• Game rules: an exact and exhaustive description of the physical rules of a game, e.g., if player 1
does a, then player 2 is allowed to choose either c or d which lead to outcomes o or o′ respectively.
• Game runs: a temporal structure of the potential plays of the game, e.g., there are two possible plays
ac and ad that start with action a by player 1, and these two plays end up with o and o′ respectively
depending on the action by player 2.
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Essentially, game rules tell us what moves one player can make at which stage of the game, and game runs
denote a global picture of the potential plays according to the rules. Most game theorists would agree on
the rule-view although in many expositions of extensive form games the states in the game structures are
essentially histories of actions, which fits the run-view better (cf. e.g., Osbourne and Rubinstein (1994)).
The run-view is also more intuitive to logicians who are familiar with temporal logic (cf. e.g., Halpern
(2003)). In fact, in the settings like Game 1 where players always know ‘where they are’, these two views
on game structures do not make a significant difference.
In contrast with games like Game 1, there is an important class of extensive form games which are
called games with imperfect information, represented usually by the tree-like structures with ‘bubbles’ of
states belonging to the same player, such as Game 2 above. The bubbles are called ‘information sets’
which are supposed to capture the imperfect information that the players have when they need to make
a decision: the players may not know the actual state of the game, e.g., in most card games you do
not know others’ hands. This lack of information may affect the ability of the players in obtaining the
favorable outcomes of the game. For example, if player 2 prefers outcome o over o′, then in Game 1 she
can always make sure o by choosing c or d wisely according to player 1’s earlier choice, but she cannot
do so in Game 2, since she cannot distinguish the two decision points which require different actions to
guarantee o.
In different contexts, different interpretations are given to information sets. For example, in Game 2
above, the information set may mean:
1. ‘Player 2 is not informed where she is’
2. ‘Player 2 cannot distinguish two histories a and b’
3. ‘Player 2 does not observe the choice by player 1’
The choice of the interpretation seems innocent at the first glance, and most game theorists view inform-
ation sets as part of the game rules (cf. e.g, Osbourne and Rubinstein (1994)):
• Rule-view: information sets are primitive physical rules which describe information given to the
players by the game.
However, if we look closer, only interpretation 1 above barely fits the idea of rules: player 2 may be given
the same information at two different states of the game (by an external game master). Interpretations 2
and 3 are more about the abilities of the players rather than physical rules: whether players can remember,
infer or observe during the plays of the game. Moreover, there are two crucial concepts in such games
which do not fit the rule view very well: uniform strategy and perfect recall. Uniform strategy requires a
player to choose uniformly among all the states in her information set. Perfect recall describes a property
of the players who, roughly speaking, do not forget what she has already distinguished in the past: if
two states are not in the same information set of some player then their descendants in the game are
also not in the same information set for the same player. However, although the player may be given the
same information according to the rules, they may learn more by reasoning cleverly during a play. In
such a case, why should they stick to the uniform strategies? On the other hand, the information given
to the players according to the rules has nothing to do with the ability to recall or to forget. A moment of
reflection would take you closer to the following run-view where the above concepts make more sense:
• Run-view: information sets describe the actual uncertainty that the players have during the plays.
However, is this rule-vs.-run distinction just a negligible conceptual difference? Can we keep overloading
the interpretations of information sets? In fact, in the literature of game theory there have been indeed
doubts about the interpretation of the information sets. Most notably, Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a,b)
challenged the game theorists to explain some tricky examples of imperfect information games without
perfect recall. Consider the following game with a player and nature (N) who makes a random move at
the beginning to either x1 or x2 with 0.5 probability each. The player has to choose what to do next at
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It is not hard to calculate that to maximize the expected payoff (which is 3), the player should choose s at
x1 and b at x2 and r at the information set {x3, x4}. However, when playing the game, it seems that the
player may benefit by changing the strategy conditionally: at x1, she may just change to do b at x1 and
do l at the information set {x3, x4}; if the player is at x2 she can just stick to her original strategy. In the
end this conditional strategy will give the player an expected payoff of 3.5: something goes wrong! As
Halpern (1997) correctly pointed out, by memorizing the strategy and its changes, the player is essentially
mimicking the behavior of a perfect recall player. Essentially, the player may choose differently on the
information set of {x3, x4}: they may be able to distinguish x3 and x4! The information set itself does not
really capture the actual indistinguishability of the player. The problem lies in the fact that what is really
known and not known during the play are not fully specified by the information sets.
Actually, the problem is not always about imperfect recall, it may go wrong with perfect recall players.
For example, in the following Game 3, although player 2 has the information set, if she knows that player
1 is rational and prefers strictly o1 and o2 to o3 or o4, then she is sure that she will end up with the left state
in the information set. In this case she can tell where she is after player 1’s move. As another example,
Game 4 illustrates a game which may go on forever.1 It is reasonable to assume that player 2 cannot
distinguish the two states for the first time (according to the rules on information), but will she have the
same uncertainty after reaching the states in the information sets again by doing something herself? It
depends on our assumption about the player but not the game rules.
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Game 4
By now we have argued that although game theorists usually take the rule-view of the imperfect
information games, the concepts related to information sets are best explained in terms of runs, and the
two do not always coincide.
1.2 The basic ideas behind our proposal
We propose to separate rules and runs explicitly, and study how to compute from rules to runs with
assumptions of players’ information and ability. As we will see, occasionally rules and runs do coincide
structurally, and this may explain why many people implicitly embrace the mix-up interpretation. In this
work, we focus on the perfect recall players but the framework can be generalized to imperfect recall
players, to which we will come back at the end of the paper.
To start with, we separate game rules and the player assumptions, and further break down each part
into intuitive explicit components:
1Although in classic game theory the game structures are tree-like structures based on partial histories, computer scientists
are particular interested in the infinite games which can be represented finitely, which have to involve cycles.
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• Game rules:
– Game arena: at which state what actions can be done by whom with what outcomes;
– Game information: what information at which state should be available to whom according to
the game.
• Player assumptions:
– Initial uncertainties: uncertainty about where to start;
– Personal observability: how players see each others’ actions;
– Knowledge updating mechanism: how players handle new information.
Therefore a complete game model for generating the game runs is a tuple:
〈game arena, game infomation, initial uncertainties, observation of actions, update mechanism〉
In this way, there is no double meaning for information sets any more: they are either the information
provided by the games or the information that players learn during the plays. For example, in card
games, each state of the game (based on the distributions of the cards) should at least give each player
the information of his own hand, whose turn it is, and the previous cards that others played in the current
round. As for the player assumptions in a card game, the players should not be sure about the initial
distribution of the game since the cards are usually drawn randomly from a deck. During the play, players
may see each others’ actions unless they do not pay attention to. However, if the game involves privately
getting new cards from the remaining deck, the players should not be able to distinguish others’ actions
of getting different cards unless they cheat. Finally, the knowledge updating mechanism determines the
reasoning power of the players and implicitly captures the memory of the agents. For example, although
a player has exactly the same information about two states sharing the same hand of hers (she cannot
see others’ hands), she may still be able to distinguish those two states in the real play. For example, if
Spade 3 has been played before, then a perfect recall player can exclude the state where the opponent
has Spade 3 from then on, although the game rules give her exactly the same information on the state
with or without Spade 3 at the opponent’s hand.
Now, how do we compute the game runs from game rules? Roughly speaking, the computation schema
is as follows:
Game runs = Game rules × Player assumptions
More precisely, we start from the initial uncertainty, and compute the next level using the update mech-
anism based on the game information and observability of the players, guided by the game arena about
the available actions. The idea comes from the connection between epistemic temporal logic (ETL) and
dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) explored by van Benthem et al. (2009), where iteratedly updating the epi-
stemic model produces a temporal structure with epistemic relations. The exact computation is also
inspired by the update product proposed in dynamic epistemic logic by Baltag et al. (1998) where perfect
recall is assumed implicitly. In general, our computation of the game runs can be viewed as an attempt
towards the theory of play proposed by van Benthem (2014) where what the players actually do and learn
during the plays are crucial.
In this paper, based on the above ideas, we develop a dynamic epistemic logic to describe the properties
of players during the plays. Interestingly, the logic stays the same if we define a static semantics over a
special class of two-dimensional ETL models which captures the essential properties of the computed
runs. We will use this connection to axiomatize our dynamic epistemic logic completely.
Another contribution of the paper is that we give some conditions under which the game rules them-
selves are just enough to induce the game runs modulo some structure equivalence notions. This may
explain why in some cases the distinction between the game rule view and the game run view is blurred.
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1.3 Related work
• Halpern (1997) sharply points out the ambiguity of the interpretations of game trees with informa-
tion sets, and uses interpreted systems to model the game plays in order to solve the puzzles about
imperfect recall (cf. also Halpern (2003)). Halpern and Moses (2007) use this framework to eleg-
antly unify solution concepts of extensive form games by very simple knowledge-based programs.
However, this line of work does not distinguish the rules of the game and the player assumptions as
we do. Moreover, the run models there (interpreted systems) are global descriptions which are not
computed step by step according to player assumptions.
• Based on van Benthem et al. (2009), (van Benthem, 2014, Chapter 9) discusses in length on how
to decorate a game tree (without uncertainty) with the information sets by DEL-like updates. Char-
acterization results are given on generated runs modulo isomorphism. Here, we separate the uncer-
tainty given by the game rules and information obtained by the agents based on their ability, and
consider the class of run models generated by rules modulo logical equivalence rather than isomorph-
ism, which leaves the run models much more flexible. We do not use propositional preconditions
but the game rules to guide the computation of the runs.
• A closely related work in the setting of general game playing is Game Description Language with
Imperfect information (GDL-II) proposed by Schiffel and Thielscher (2014), where game rules and
the assumptions about the agents are described syntactically. Our approach is largely semantic
and makes a clear distinction between rules and player assumptions. We will come back to the
comparison with GDL-II at the end of the paper.
• Goranko and Hawke (2010) introduce concurrent informational game structures (CIGS) with two un-
certainty relations: one a priori and one empirical capturing the uncertainty player has at the begin-
ning of the game (like our game information) and in the actual plays respectively. In Goranko and Pacuit
(2014), some general thoughts are given on the computation of the empirical uncertainty based on
the a priori information of the game and player abilities.
• Our treatment of game information based on information pieces came from the work by Kaneko and Kline
(2008) on inductive game theory where the game structure is not known in advance but could be
explored by the players in different plays. Kaneko and Kline (2008) also treat the memory of play-
ers in terms of the past experiences (sequences of information pieces) explicitly which we do not
pursue here.
• We make use of the general techniques developed by Wang and Cao (2013) and Wang and Aucher
(2013) to axiomatize the dynamic epistemic logic without reduction axioms, via a class of normal
run models. Note that there is no action preconditions but the game rules to guide the executions of
the actions, which bring us closer to the work on dynamic epistemic logics over transition systems
explored in Wang and Li (2012); Yu et al. (2015).
Structure of the paper Section 2 fleshes out formally the above informal ideas of the game rules and
player assumptions. Section 3 shows how to compute the runs, which satisfy certain normality condi-
tions. We also show that, under certain conditions about the players, rules and the computed runs are
structurally similar. Section 4 introduces a simple epistemic language to talk about the properties of the
game, with two semantics based on rules (DEL-like) and normal runs (ETL-like) respectively. It is proven
that the two semantics are equivalent in terms of the validities. In Section 5 we give a complete axiomat-
ization of our logic to clarify the underlying assumptions of our framework from a syntactic perspective.
In Section 6 we conclude with future directions.
2 Game rules and player assumptions
In this section we introduce a formal account of the game rules, initial uncertainties, personal observabil-
ity, and the knowledge updating mechanism. Let us begin with the formalization of our intuitive ideas of
the game rules.
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Definition 1 (Game structure) Given a non-empty finite set I of players, a non-empty finite set of actions
A = ⊎i∈IAi consisting of mutually disjoint sets Ai for each player i, a finite set of information pieces P such
that {pa | a ∈ A} ⊆ P, a game structure w.r.t. A, I, and P is a tuple: G = 〈S,R,O〉 where:
• S is a non-empty set of states;
• R is a partial function S × A → S s.t. if R(s, a) is defined, then ι(s) = i for some i ∈ I, where ι(s) = i
iff ∅ ⊂ {a | R(s, a) is defined} ⊆ Ai;
• O : S× I→ 2P is a function assigning each game state s and each player i a set of external information
pieces that are available to i such that for each a ∈ Ai, p
a ∈ O(s, i) iff R(s, a) is defined.
〈S,R〉 is called the game arena and O gives the game information, and ι is the player assignment function
induced by R. To simplify notation, we write sRat for R(s, a) = t.
Given a game structure G, we denote its set of states, relations and information by SG , R
G
a and OG .
Given an s ∈ SG, let e(s) be the set of available actions at s, i.e., {a | R(s, a) is defined}. Let ei(s) = e(s)
if ι(s) = i otherwise ei(s) = ∅.
Note that in this paper we separate the actions by different players in a syntactic way, which helps to
simplify the presentation. We can read the functions R and O as collections of conditionals which fit the
intuitive idea of game ‘rules’: if player i is at state s then certain actions and information are available
to i. By the definition of R, the available actions at a game state are deterministic, and they all (if any)
belong to a single player. Moreover, we do not require the game structure to be a tree-like structure and
cycles are allowed.
Intuitively, the information pieces can be viewed as basic propositions andO is then a player-dependent
valuation about those propositions. In particular, {pa | a ∈ A} tells the agents what actions are available.
Note that, unlike Kaneko and Kline (2008), different players can be given different information on the
same state, e.g., the players who are not to make the choices may not get the information on the available
actions according to our condition on O. Clearly, the game information induces an equivalence relation
and thus a partition over the game arena for each agent, which captures the rule-view of information
sets.2
Sometimes the players may not be sure about where they start exactly in the game, e.g., a random
distribution of cards may let the players wonder about each others’ hands. The following definition
describes this (initial) uncertainty using Kripke model like structures w.r.t. a given game.
Definition 2 (Epistemic model) An epistemic model w.r.t. a game structure G is a tuple: M = (W,f,∼, V )
where:
• W is a nonempty set;
• f : W → SG assigns each w ∈W a state in the game G;
• ∼: I → 2W×W assigns an equivalence relation over W to each i ∈ I such that w ∼i v implies
OG(f(w), i) = OG(f(v), i).
• V : W × I→ 2P such that V (w, i) = OG(f(w), i).
A pointed epistemic model is an epistemic model with a designated world. When G and P are clear we useM
or (W,f,∼, V ) to denote an epistemic model.
Note that ∼ is restricted by OG , for after all if game rules tell a player that he/she is at state s instead
of state t, then surely he/she knows. Due to our previous assumption about OG the players always
know what they can do when they are supposed to move. Formally we can verify that w ∼i v implies
ei(f(w)) = ei(f(v)) for any w, v inM.
2A crucial difference between game information and information that player may learn later in the runs is that the equivalence
relation of the game information should be common knowledge, while during the play not everything is commonly known
intuitively.
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In the actual plays, players may acquire more information than those provided by game rules. This is
because players may be able to observe more (e.g., peeking others’ hands in a card game). In this paper
we use the following structure to capture the observation power in terms of indistinguishability among
actions.
Definition 3 (Observation model) An observation model U w.r.t. A is a tuple (A,!) where:
• ! : I→ 2A×A assigns an equivalence relation over A to each player.
Intuitively, observation models characterize players’ observation power for actions being conducted.
Under this interpretation, a!i b can be read as, given actions a and b, player i is unable to distinguish
which one has been conducted. The equivalence relations clearly induce partitions over A for each i. 3
Let M be the class of all the epistemic models w.r.t. a certain G. Given an observation model U , an
updater ⊛ w.r.t. U is a function: M → M such that W⊛(M) ⊆ WM × AU . Following the convention, we
writeM⊛ U for ⊛(M) and writeM⊛ Uk forM⊛ U . . .⊛ U︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
, withM⊛ U0 =M.
The runs of an imperfect information game is determined by 〈G,W, f,∼, w,U ,⊛〉. In this paper we
focus on the following updater inspired by Baltag et al. (1998):
Definition 4 (Update Product ⊗) Fixing G and thus A, an epistemic model M = (W,f,∼, V ) and an
observation model U = (A,!), the product model is an epistemic model (M⊗U) = (W ′, f ′,∼′, V ′) where:
W ′ = {(w, a) | w ∈W,a ∈ e(f(w))}
f ′((w, a)) = R(f(w), a)
∼′i = {((w, a), (u, b)) | w ∼i u, a!i b and
OG(R(f(w), a), i) = OG(R(f(u), b), i)}
V ′((w, a), i) = OG(R(f(w), a), i)
✁
It is worth noting that we assume that players can perfectly recall but have limited reasoning power,
that is, players’ knowledge relies only on previous knowledge, personal observability and information
provided by game rules. Also note that the above definition can make sure that M⊗ U is still a well-
defined epistemic model w.r.t. G unlessW ′ = ∅, as is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let G be any game structure, and letM be any epistemic model w.r.t. G. ThenM⊗U is still
an epistemic model w.r.t. G if its domain is not empty.
PROOF LetM = (W,f,∼, V ) andM⊗ U = (W ′, f ′,∼′, V ′). Suppose W ′ is not empty. Then it is easy
to check, by Definition 4 that f ′ is a function from W ′ to SG . ∼i is an equivalence relation because both
∼i and!i are equivalence relation.
Let i ∈ I and (w, a), (u, b) ∈W ′. First we show that
(w, a) ∼′i (u, b) implies OG(f
′(w, a), i) = OG(f
′(u, b), i).
Suppose (w, a) ∼′i (u, b). Then OG(R(f(w), a), i) = OG(R(f(u), b), i). Because f
′(w, a) = R(f(w), a) and
f ′(u, b) = R(f(u), b), we obtain OG(f
′(w, a), i) = OG(f
′(u, b), i).
Then we need to prove that
V ′((w, a), i) = OG(f
′(w, a), i).
But this is straightforward since by Definition 3, f ′(w, a) = R(f(w), a) and V ′((w, a), i) = OG(R(f(w), a), i).
✷
3Note that in our definition of U , we may also assume that players can always distinguish actions conducted by themselves.
However we do not make this restriction in this paper. This is not only for simplicity, but also because, for instance, players may
be required to act blindfolded in certain games. Furthermore, since if every player cannot distinguish a and b, then a and b can
be treated as the same action with two possible outcomes, which may also allow us to describe a certain degree of indeterminacy,
even though we presume determinacy in game rules.
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3 Game runs
In this section, we first define a class of epistemic temporal models with both the epistemic relations and
the transitions representing actions. We use such structures to represent game runs which are computed
from game rules and player assumptions. These run models are constructed, layer by layer, by the update
mechanism in Definition 4, such that the founding layer is the epistemic model representing the initial
uncertainty, and each other layer is an updated model of the previous layer. Furthermore, between
successive layers there are action relations linking states in one layer to the successor states in the next
layer. We show that these run models are epistemic temporal models with certain properties.
In the second subsection, we compare game structures and run models. First we establish a result
showing that it is unnecessary to distinguish run models between game rules for perfect information
games, modulo p-morphism. Second, we analyze how observation power affects players’ knowledge
provided that the game has no initial uncertainty and everyone can perfectly recall.
Note that in this section and the following sections we will fix the players set I, the action set A and
the set of information pieces P.
3.1 Computing the runs
We first introduce a 2-dimensional model incorporating both knowledge and actions to accommodate the
runs of the games with uncertainty.
Definition 6 (Epistemic temporal model) An epistemic temporal model N is a tuple:
(W, {∼i| i ∈ I}, {
a
→| a ∈ A}, V )
where:
• W is a nonempty set;
• for each i ∈ I, ∼i is an equivalence relation overW ;
• for each a ∈ A,
a
→ ⊆W ×W ;
• V is a function: W × I→ 2P.
Since I and A are fixed, we will write (W,∼,→, V ) for (W, {∼i| i ∈ I}, {
a
→| a ∈ A}, V ). Furthermore, we
call (W,∼,→) the epistemic temporal frame of N = (W,∼,→, V ), and (W,∼, V ) the epistemic core of N
(notation N−). For a sequence of events h = a0 . . . ak we write w
h
→ w′ for w
a0→ . . .
ak→ w′. ✁
We use Act(s) for {a | ∃t ∈ W such that s
a
→ t}, and Turn(s) for {i | Act(s) 6= ∅ and Act(s) ⊆ Ai}.
Recall that in a game structure, e(s) = {a | R(s, a) is defined}, and ι(s) = i iff ∅ ⊂ e(s) ⊆ Ai. Act(s) and
Turn(s) are essentially the counterparts of e(s) and ι(s) in epistemic temporal models. Note that Turn(s)
can be empty when s enables actions from different players.
Now we define the run model generated by updating U repeatedly given a game structure G using the
ideas in van Benthem et al. (2009):
Definition 7 (Run model) Given an epistemic model M w.r.t. a game structure G. The run model gener-
ated by repeatedly updating U , written as F⊗(M), is an epistemic temporal model:
(W, {∼i| i ∈ I}, {
a
→| a ∈ A}, V )
where:
• W = {(s, a1, . . . , ak) | 0 ≤ k, (s, a1, . . . , ak) exists inM⊗U
k and fM(s)R
G
a1t1R
G
a2 . . . R
G
ak
tk for some t1, . . . , tk ∈
SG};
• (s, a1, . . . , ak) ∼i (t, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
j) iff k = j, and (s, a1, . . . , ak) ∼i (t, a
′
1, . . . , a
′
k) inM⊛ U
k;
• (s, a1, . . . , ak)
a
→ (t, a′1, . . . , a
′
j) iff s = t and a
′
1 . . . a
′
j = a1 . . . aka;
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• V ((s, a1, . . . , ak), i) = VM⊗Uk((s, a1, . . . , ak), i).
The induced state assignment function f : W → SG w.r.t. F
⊗(M) is given by:
• f((s, a1, . . . , ak)) = fM⊗Uk((s, a1, . . . , ak)).
✁
Intuitively, F⊗(M) is an update universe consisting of the updated models in the form ofM⊗Uk linked
by update transitions
a
→. Note that we assume perfect recall, and our definition of ∼i represents this
assumption.
Remark 1 Given an observation model U and an epistemic model M w.r.t. a game G, the run model
F⊗(M) = (W,∼,→, V ) and its induced state assignment function f satisfy that for all w, u ∈ W , a, b ∈ A
and i ∈ I:
• f((w, a)) = RG(f(w), a);
• if a ∈ e(f(w)), then (w, a) ∈W ;
• if there are s, t ∈W such that s
a
→ w and t
b
→ u, then:
w ∼i u iff s ∼i t, a!i b and OG(f(w), i) = OG(f(u), i);
• V (w, i) = OG(f(w), i).
We give some examples below to illustrate our ideas of the computation of game runs from game
rules and player assumptions (we omit the game information O and only show the induced information
sets for player 2 in the game structures; singleton information sets are omitted, similarly for the reflexive
epistemic arrows in the run models):
Game structure:
s : 1
a✔
✔✔
✔
		✔✔
✔✔
b
✰✰
✰✰
✰
✰✰
t : 2
c✙
✙✙
✙
✙✙
✙✙
d
✪✪
✪✪

✪✪
✪✪
t′ : 2
c✘
✘✘
✘
✘✘
✘✘
d
✫✫
✫✫

✫✫
✫✫
o1 o2 o3 o4
❴
✔
❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴
✤
❚
✤✤ ✤✤✤
❚❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴❴ ✔
Initial
uncertainty:
w : s
1,2

Observation model:
a
1,2

b
1,2

c
1,2

d
1,2

Run model:
w : s
a✑
✑✑
✑
✑✑
✑✑
b
✲✲
✲✲
✲
✲✲
wa : t
c✘
✘✘
✘
✘✘
✘✘
d
✬✬
✬✬
✬
✬✬
wb : t′
c✗
✗✗
✗
✗✗
✗✗
d
✬✬
✬✬
✬
✬✬
wac wadwbc wbd
Game structure:
s : 1
a✗
✗✗
✗
✗✗
✗✗
b
✯✯
✯✯
✯
✯✯
t : 2
c
77
d
★★
★★

★★
★★
t′ : 2
c✙
✙✙
✙
✙✙
✙
d
dd
o o′
❴
✔
❴ ❴ ❴ ❴
✤
❚
✤✤ ✤✤✤
❚❴ ❴ ❴ ❴❴ ✔
Initial
uncertainty:
w : s
1,2

Observation model:
a
1,2

2 b
1,2

c
1,2

d
1,2

Run model:
w : s
a✑
✑✑
✑
✑✑
✑✑
b
✲✲
✲✲
✲
✲✲
wa : t
2
c✔
✔✔
✔
		✔✔
✔✔
d
✬✬
✬✬

✬✬
✬
wb : t′
c✗
✗✗
✗
✗✗
✗✗
d
✱✱
✱✱
✱
✱✱
wac : t
c

d
✰✰
✰
✰
✰✰
✰
wadwbc wbd : t′
d

c✑
✑✑
✑
✑✑
✑✑
✑
Game structure:
s : 1
a

s′ : 1
b

t : 2
c✖
✖✖
✖


✖✖
✖✖
d
✭✭
✭✭
✭
✭✭
✭
t′ : 2
c✕
✕✕
✕


✕✕
✕✕
d
✮✮
✮✮
✮
✮✮
✮
o1 o2o3 o4
❴
✔
❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴
✤
❚
✤✤ ✤✤✤
❚❴ ❴ ❴ ❴ ❴❴ ✔
Initial
uncertainty:
w : s 1
1,2

u : s
1,2

2
v : s′1,2 88
Observation model:
a
1,2

b
1,2

c
1,2

d
1,2

Run model:
w : s
a

1 u : s
a

2 v : s′
b

wa : t 1 ua : t vb : t′
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In the following, we define a class of epistemic temporal models with respect to a given observation
model U , to be used in the later proofs.
Definition 8 (Normal epistemic temporal model) An epistemic temporal model N = (W,∼,→, V ) is
normal w.r.t. U if the following properties hold for all s, t, t′ in N , a, b ∈ A and i in I:
Nm (no miracles) if s ∼i s
′ and s′
a
→ t′ then for all b and t such that s
b
→ t, b!i a and V (t, i) = V (t
′, i),
we have t ∼i t
′;
Pr (perfect recall) if s
a
→ t and t ∼i t
′ then there is an s′ such that s ∼i s
′ and s′
b
→ t′ for some b such that
a!i b in U ;
(Det) if s
a
→ t and s
a
→ t′, then t = t′;
(Exturn) if Act(s) 6= ∅, then Act(s) ⊆ Aj for some j ∈ I;
(Info) for each a ∈ Ai, p
a ∈ V (s, i) iff s
a
→ t′ for some t′ ∈W ;
(Ke) if w ∼i v then V (w, i) = V (v, i).
Now we show that all the generated models are normal.
Proposition 9 Given an epistemic model M w.r.t. a game structure G, let F⊗(M) = (W,∼,→, V ) be the
epistemic temporal model generated by repeatedly updating U , and let f be the induced state assignment
function w.r.t. F⊗(M). Then F⊗(M) is a normal epistemic temporal model.
PROOF We check that F⊗(M) satisfies all the conditions of normal epistemic temporal model. Let
w = (w′, a1, . . . , ak), u = (u
′, b1, . . . , bn), v = (v
′, c1, . . . , cm) ∈W,
a ∈ I and i ∈ I.
Nm. Suppose w ∼i u and u
a
→ v. Consider any s ∈ W and b ∈ A such that w
b
→ s, a !i b and
V (v, i) = V (s, i). Using Remark 1 we have v ∼i s.
Pr. Suppose w
a
→ u and u ∼i v. Then n = m, and hence (v
′, c1, . . . , cm−1)
cm→ v. Using Definition 7 we
have w ∼i (v
′, c1, . . . , cm−1) and a!i cm
Det. By the definition ofW and→, it is easy to see.
Exturn. Suppose a ∈ Act(w). Then by Remark 1, f((w, a)) = RG(f(w), a). It follows that, by
Definition 1, e(f(w)) ⊆ Aj for some j ∈ I, which implies, using Definition 7, Act(w) ⊆ Aj .
Info. Suppose a ∈ Ai. Then p
a ∈ V (w, i) iff pa ∈ OG(f(w), i) iff RG(f(w), a) is defined, iff w
a
→ s for
some s ∈W .
Ke. Suppose w ∼i u. By Remark 1 we have V (w, i) = OG(f(w), i) = OG(f(u), i) = V (u, i). ✷
Later in the paper we will show that any normal epistemic temporal model can also be generated from
some epistemic model modulo logical equivalence w.r.t. the language to be introduced later.
3.2 Structural comparison between game rules and run models
In this subsection, we first use p-morphism to demonstrate that for perfect information games, the game
structures are actually the p-morphic images of their run models, no matter what observation model is
assumed. Here a perfect information game is a game structure whose induced information sets for each
player are singletons, i.e., each game state is given a unique set of information pieces for each player.
Next, we examine the impact of observational power on players’ knowledge given perfect recall w.r.t. the
game information and certainty of the initial state.
The following definition of p-morphism is an adaptation of the standard one in modal logic.
Definition 10 (p-morphism) LetM = (W, {∼i| i ∈ I}, {Ra | a ∈ A}, V ) and N = (W
′, {∼′i| i ∈ I}, {R
′
a |
a ∈ A}, V ′) be two epistemic temporal models. A function f : W → W ′ is a p-morphism fromM to N if for
all w, u ∈W , s ∈W ′ and a ∈ A:
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• for each i ∈ I, V (w, i) = V ′(f(w), i);
• w ∼i u only if f(w) ∼
′
i f(u);
• if f(w) ∼′i s, then there is a v ∈W such that f(v) = s and w ∼i v;
• wRau only if f(w)R
′
af(u);
• if f(w)R′as, then there is a v ∈W such that f(v) = s and wRav.
✁
It is a standard result in modal logic that p-morphisms preserve the truth value of modal formulas (cf.
Blackburn et al. (2002)).
To facilitate the comparison, we can view a game structure as an epistemic temporal model where the
indistinguishability relation is induced by the information pieces.
Definition 11 (Induced epistemic game structure) Given a game structure G = (S,R,O), the induced
epistemic game structure E(G) is (S,∼, R,O) where ∼i= {(s, t) | O(s, i) = O(t, i)}. A perfect information
game is a game structure where ∼i are identity relations in E(G). ✁
Note that E(G) can be viewed as an epistemic temporal structure. The following proposition shows that
for perfect information games, the induced state assignment functions are p-morphisms from their run
models to the induced epistemic game structures. Also note that this also means that the state assignment
functions are also p-morphisms from the run models to the game structures, if we neglect the epistemic
relations in the run models and the conditions for ∼ in p-morphisms.
Proposition 12 Let G be a perfect information game, M be an epistemic model, F⊗(M) = (W,∼,→, V )
be the run model generated by repeatedly updating some observation model U , and f be the induced state
assignment function w.r.t. F⊗(M). Then f is a p-morphism from F⊗(M) to E(G) = (S,∼′, R,O).
PROOF Note that by Definition 11, G = (S,R,O). Let w, u ∈ W , s ∈ S and a ∈ A. First we check
the conditions for the action transitions. Clearly w
a
→ u implies f(w)Raf(u) by the definition of the run
model. On the other hand, suppose f(w)Ras then again by the definition of the run models there is a
u = (w, a) in W such that f(u) = f(w, a) = R(f(w), a) = s by Remark 1 and the fact that R is a partial
function. By definition w
a
→ u in the run model. Second, we need to verify the conditions for the epistemic
relations. Suppose w ∼i u, then O(f(w), i) = O(f(u), i) in G by the definition of epistemic relations in
the run models. Now f(w) ∼i f(u) in E(G) by the definition. On the other hand, suppose that f(w) ∼
′
i s
in E(G). Since G is a perfect information game f(w) = s. It is clear that w ∼i w in the run model. Finally,
by Remark 1, for each i ∈ I, V (w, i) = O(f(w), i), and this completes our proof. ✷
Note that, in the above proof, the observation model U does not play a role under the assumption
of perfect information. The above result may explain why we do not need to distinguish the run view
from the rule view in perfect information games. However, for imperfect information games in general,
the induced epistemic temporal models are very different from the run models which crucially depend on
the observation models. There is no general structural relation like p-morphism or bisimulation between
them. In the following, we unravel the game structures into game trees and induce epistemic relations on
them w.r.t. (a version of) perfect recall to explore the similarity between game structures and run models
further. In this way, we can also exam the impact of observation models precisely.
Definition 13 (Generated epistemic game tree) Let G = (S,R,O) be a game structure, and let s ∈ S.
The epistemic game tree G↾s generated from s with perfect recall is a tuple (S′, {⌢i| i ∈ I}, R
′, O′) where
• S′ = {(s, a1, . . . , an) | 0 ≤ n and sRa1t1Ra2 · · ·Rantn for some a1, . . . , an ∈ A and t1, . . . , tn ∈ S};
• for all w, u ∈ S′ and i ∈ I, w ⌢i u iff there are a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bn ∈ A and w1, . . . , wn, u1, . . . , un ∈
S′ s.t. w = wn, u = un, sR
′
a1w1R
′
a2 · · ·R
′
anwn, sR
′
b1
u1R
′
b2
· · ·R′bnun and O
′(wk, i) = O
′(uk, i) for each
natural number k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n;
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• for each a ∈ A, R′a = {(w, u) ∈ S
′ × S′ | u = (w, a) for some a ∈ A};
• for each t = (s, a1, . . . , an) ∈ S
′ and each i ∈ I, O′(t, i) = O(tn, i), where tn is the state such that
sRa1t1Ra2 · · ·Rantn for some t1, . . . , tn−1 ∈ S.
Note that in the above definition, ⌢i is computed by synchronously matching the history of the game
information given to agent i. It is a version of prefect recall without considering the agents’ observation
power of actions. It can be verified that if w ⌢i u and O
′((w, a), i) = O′((u, b), i) then (w, a) ⌢i (u, b).
In the following definition, we introduce epistemic models without initial uncertainty. We also intro-
duce a natural correspondence between run models and epistemic game trees. Last we give a condition
on observation models which characterizes the inability of observational influence on players’ knowledge.
Definition 14 Let G be a game structure, M = (W,f∗,∼, V ) be an epistemic model w.r.t G, G↾s = (S′,⌢
,R′, O′) be the epistemic game tree generated from some s ∈ SG , U = (A,!) be an observation model,
F⊗(M) = (W ′,∼′,→, V ′) be the run model generated by repeatedly updating U , and f be the induced state
assignment function w.r.t. F⊗(M):
• M is a certainty epistemic model if W is a singleton, i.e., the starting state is common knowledge;
• tracking function g : W ′ → S′ from F⊗(M) to G↾s is a partial function given by: g(w, a1, . . . , an) =
(f∗(w), a1, . . . , an). Note that g is defined only on the states (w, a1, . . . , an) such that f
∗(w) = s;
• U is non-informative w.r.t. F⊗(M) if for all w, u, s, t ∈W ′, a, b ∈ A and i ∈ I, such that w
a
→ s, u
b
→ t
and w ∼′i u, if a 6!i b, then V
′(s, i) 6= V ′(t, i).
Intuitively the non-informative condition says that players’ observability cannot provide more informa-
tion than the game information. Now we prove that the non-informative condition of observation models
characterizes the observational influence on knowledge of perfect recall players provided the game runs
have no initial uncertainty.
Theorem 15 Let G be a game structure, U be an observation model, M = ({v}, f∗,∼, V ) be a certainty
epistemic model, G↾f
∗(v) = (S′,⌢,R′, O′) be the epistemic game tree generated from f∗(v), F⊗(M) =
(W ′,∼′,→, V ′) be the run model generated by repeatedly updating U , and g be the tracking function from
F⊗(M) to G↾f
∗(v). Then U is non-informative w.r.t. F⊗(M) iff g is an isomorphism from F⊗(M) to G↾f
∗(v).
PROOF If we ignore the epistemic relations, the temporal structure of F⊗(M) is clearly isomorphic to
the unravelling of the game structure defined in G↾f
∗(v), given thatM has only one state v. In particular,
we have V ′(u, i) = O′(g(u), i) for any u ∈ W ′. We only need to consider the epistemic relations to
establish a full isomorphism between the two.
Left to right: Assume that U is non-informative. Consider any w = (v, a1, . . . , am), u = (v, b1, . . . , bn) ∈
W ′ and i ∈ I we need to show that:
w ∼′i u ⇐⇒ g(w) ⌢i g(u)
The claim holds trivially if m 6= n due to the definitions of ∼′ and ⌢ based on the implicitly assumed
synchronicity. Thus we only need to consider the case whenm = n. Here an inductive proof on n suffices.
Suppose n = 0, then w = u = v thus both w ∼′i u and g(w) ⌢i g(u) hold trivially. Suppose that the claim
holds for n = k. Now we show the claim also holds for the case of n = k + 1.
If w ∼′i u, then by definition of ∼
′: (v, a1, . . . , ak) ∼
′
i (v, b1, . . . , bk) and V
′(w, i) = V ′(u, i) thus
O′(g(w), i) = O′(g(u), i). By I.H., (f∗(v), a1, . . . , ak) ⌢i (f
∗(v), b1, . . . , bk) which means up to j ≤ k the
information on (f∗(v), a1, . . . , aj) and (f
∗(v), b1, . . . , bj) step-wisely coincide. Therefore by definition of
⌢i, g(w) ⌢i g(u).
If g(w) ⌢i g(u) then O
′(g(w), i) = O′(g(u), i) and (f∗(v), a1, . . . , ak) ⌢i (f
∗(v), b1, . . . , bk) by the
definition of ⌢i. By I.H. (v, a1, . . . , ak) ∼
′
i (v, b1, . . . , bk). If ak+1 !i bk+1 then w ∼
′
i v by definition. If
ak+1 6!i bk+1, by non-informativeness V
′(w, i) 6= V ′(v, i) which contradicts the fact that O′(g(w), i) =
O′(g(u), i). Therefore ak+1 !i bk+1 and then w ∼
′
i v.
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Right to left: Suppose towards contradiction that U is not non-informative but g is an isomorphism.
Then there are w, u, s, t ∈ W ′, a, b ∈ A and i ∈ I such that a 6!i b, w ∼
′
i u, w
a
→ s, u
b
→ t and
V ′(s, i) = V ′(t, i). It follows that s ≁i t but O
′(g(s), i) = O′(g(t), i). Since we assume that g is an
isomorphism, g(w) ⌢i g(u) thus by definition g(s) ⌢i g(t). Now we have s ≁i t and g(s) ⌢i g(t),
contradiction. ✷
The above simple result shows that without initial uncertainty, if action observations do not bring
more distinguishing power to the players then an unraveling of the game structure can be viewed as a run
model. This also explains why in some imperfect information games with perfect recall the distinction
between the run view and the rule view is also blurred.
4 Language and semantics
In this section, we introduce a simple logic language to talk about game runs with two equivalent (modulo
validity) semantics based on epistemic models and normal epistemic temporal models respectively.
Definition 16 Given a non-empty finite set of players I, a non-empty finite set A of basic actions, and a
non-empty finite set P of information pieces, the dynamic epistemic language LDEL is defined as follows:
φ ::= ⊤ | pi | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | Kiφ | [a]φ
where i ∈ I, p ∈ P, and a ∈ A. We call the [a]-free part of LDEL the epistemic language (LEL). As usual, we
define ⊥, φ∨ψ, φ→ ψ, Kˆiφ, and 〈a〉φ as the abbreviations of ¬⊤, ¬(¬φ∧¬ψ), ¬φ∨ψ, ¬Ki¬φ, and ¬[a]¬φ
respectively. We use TURNi to denote
∨
a∈Ai
〈a〉⊤.
4.1 A dynamic epistemic semantics
Given a game structure G and an epistemic model M = (W,f,∼, V ) w.r.t. G, the truth value of LDEL
formulas at a state s inM is defined as follows:4
M, w  ⊤ ⇔ always
M, w  pi ⇔ w ∈ V (p, i)
M, w  ¬φ ⇔ M, w 2 φ
M, w  φ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, w  φ andM, w  ψ
M, w  Kiψ ⇔ ∀v : w ∼i v impliesM, v  ψ
M, w  [a]φ ⇔ a ∈ e(f(w)) impliesM⊗U , (w, a)  φ
Definition 17 (G-bisimulation) Given a game structure G, a binary relation Z is called a G-bisimulation
between two epistemic modelsM and N w.r.t. G, if whenever wZu the following conditions hold:
Inv fM(w) = fN (u);
Zig if w ∼Mi w
′ for some w′ inM and i ∈ I, then there is a u′ in N such that u ∼Ni u
′ and w′Zu′;
Zag if u ∼Ni u
′ for some u′ in N and i ∈ I, then there is a w′ inM such that w ∼Mi w
′ and u′Zw′.
We say two pointed epistemic models M, s and N , t are G-bisimilar (M, s ↔G N , t) if there is a G-
bisimulation Z betweenM and N such that sZt.
Note that the invariance condition Inv in G-bisimulation is different to that in standard bisimulation
definition, where it requires w and v satisfy the same proposition letters. However, our (stronger) defin-
ition implies this requirement, for fM(w) = fN (u) only if for each i ∈ I, OG(fM(w), i) = OG(fN (u), i),
and then VM(w, i) = VN (u, i).
Proposition 18 Given a game structure G = 〈S,R,O〉, LDEL formulas are invariant with respect to  under
G-bisimulation.
4Note that we may view the model asM = (G,W, f,∼, V ) since f assumes a game G.
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PROOF Let M, s and N , t be two pointed epistemic models that are G-bisimilar, where M and N are
epistemic models w.r.t. G, and let Z be the G-bisimilation. The basic case for atomic pi hold because by
Inv, fM(s) = fN (t), which implies that
VM(s, i) = O(fM(s), i) = O(fN (t), i) = VN (t, i), for each i ∈ I.
We only consider the case [a]φ. Recall that M, s  [a]φ iff a ∈ e(fM(s)) implies M ⊗ U , (s, a)  φ,
and N , t  [a]φ iff a ∈ e(fN (t)) implies N ⊗ U , (t, a)  φ. Since fM(s) = fN (t), we can obtain that
a ∈ e(fM(s)) iff a ∈ e(fN (t)). If a /∈ e(fM(s)), then [a]φ is vacuously true in bothM, s and N , t. Suppose
a ∈ e(fM(s)). Then clearly the domains of both M⊗ U and N ⊗ U are not empty, which implies, by
Proposition 5, that M⊗ U and N ⊗ U are still epistemic models w.r.t. G. We prove M⊗ U , (s, a)  φ
iff N ⊗ U , (t, a)  φ by using induction hypothesis and showing that M⊗ U , (s, a) and N ⊗ U , (t, a) are
G-bisimilar.
Let Z ′ be a binary relation between M⊗ U and N ⊗ U such that for any (w, b) in M⊗ U and any
(u, b′) in N ⊗ U ,
(w, b)Z ′(u, b′) iff wZu and b = b′.
Clearly (s, a)Z ′(t, a), and then Z ′ is nonempty.
Let (M⊗U) = (W,f,∼, V1), (N ⊗U) = (W
′, f ′,∼′, V2), let (w, b) inM⊗U and (u, b
′) in N ⊗U such
that (w, b)Z ′(u, b′). Then b = b′, and by wZu, fM(w) = fN (u). It follows that
f(w, b) = R(fM(w), b) = R(fN (u), b
′) = f ′(u, b′).
Hence Inv holds for Z ′.
For Zig. Suppose (w, b) ∼i (w
′, c) for some (w′, c) inM⊗U and some i ∈ I. Then
w ∼i w
′, b!i c and O(R(fM(w), b), i) = O(R(fM(w
′), c), i).
BecausewZu, there is a u′ inN such that u ∼i u
′ and w′Zu′. By the definition of G-bisimulation, fM(w
′) =
fN (u
′), and then e(fM(w
′)) = e(fN (u
′)), which implies c ∈ e(fN (u
′)). It follows that R(fN (u
′), c) is
defined, and for each i ∈ I,
O(R(fM(w
′), c), i) = O(R(fN (u
′), c), i).
Recall that R(fM(w), b) = R(fN (u), b
′), and hence
O(R(fM(w), b), i) = O(R(fN (u), b
′), i).
Thus we have
O(R(fN (u), b
′), i) = O(R(fM(w), b), i) = O(R(fM(w
′), b), i) = O(R(fN (u
′), c), i),
together with u ∼i u
′, b′ = b and b !i c, we obtain (u, b
′) ∼i (u
′, c). It remains to show that
(w′, c)Z ′(u′, c), but it is straightforward, for w′Zu′ and c = c.
The case Zag is similar. ThereforeM⊗U , (s, a) and N ⊗ U , (t, a) are G-bisimilar, and this completes
our proof. ✷
4.2 An epistemic temporal semantics
Since we also want to talk about run models which are epistemic temporal structures, we define an
alternative semantics  for the language LDEL on epistemic temporal models:
N , w  ⊤ ⇔ always
N , w  pi ⇔ w ∈ V (p, i)
N , w  ¬φ ⇔ N , v 1 φ
N , w  φ ∧ ψ ⇔ N , w  φ and N , w  ψ
N , w  Kiφ ⇔ ∀v : w ∼i v implies N , w  φ
N , w  [a]φ ⇔ ∀v : w
a
→ v implies N , v  φ
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Recall that given an epistemic temporal model N , N− is its induced epistemic core. By definition, the
two semantics coincide on LEL formulas ([a]-free):
Proposition 19 For any LEL formula φ and any pointed epistemic temporal model N , w: N , w  φ ⇐⇒
N−, w  φ.
Now we induce a game from an epistemic temporal model.
Definition 20 LetN = (W,∼,→, V ) be any epistemic temporal model, the game induced byN is a structure
GN = (W,R,O)
where O = V and R ⊆W × A×W is a relation such that for all s, t ∈W and a ∈ A, 〈s, a, t〉 ∈ R iff s
a
→ t.
Next, we show that GN is indeed a game structure if N is normal.
Lemma 21 Let N = (W,∼,→, V ) be any normal epistemic temporal model, and let GN = (W,R,O) be the
game induced by N . Then GN is a game structure w.r.t. A and I; furthermore, e(s) = Act(s) for each s ∈W .
PROOF Clearly W is a non-empty set and bear in mind below that O = V . Firstly we prove that R is
a partial function from W × A to W . Let a ∈ A and s, t, t′ ∈ W such that s
a
→ t and s
a
→ t′. Since N is
normal, by (Det), we have t = t′. It follows that R is a partial function from W × A to W .
Secondly we show that if R(s, a) is defined, then ∅ ⊂ Act(s) ⊆ Ai. Suppose R(s, a) is defined for some
s ∈ W , i ∈ I and a ∈ Ai. Then Act(s) is non-empty. Because N is normal, by (Exturn) Act(s) ⊆ Aj for
some j ∈ I. Since a ∈ Ai and a ∈ Act(s), we have i = j.
Then we demonstrate that for all s ∈ W , i ∈ I and a ∈ Ai, p
a ∈ V (s, i) iff R(s, a) is defined. Consider
any s ∈ W , i ∈ I and a ∈ Ai. By (Info) p
a ∈ V (s, i) iff s
a
→ t for some t ∈ W , iff, by the definition of R,
〈s, a, t〉 ∈ R, i.e., R(s, a) is defined.
Since we have already proven that GN is indeed a game structure, for each s ∈W , e(s) is well-defined.
Thus lastly we can show that e(s) = Act(s). But this is straightforward according to the definition of e(s)
and Act(s). ✷
There is also an epistemic model hidden in an epistemic temporal model.
Definition 22 Let N = (W,∼,→, V ) be any epistemic temporal model, the epistemic part induced by N is
a tupleMN = 〈W,f,∼, V 〉 where f is the identity function on W .
Lemma 23 Let N = (W,∼,→, V ) be any normal epistemic temporal model, and letMN = 〈W,f,∼, V 〉 be
the epistemic part induced by N . ThenMN is an epistemic model w.r.t. the game structure induced by N .
PROOF By Lemma 21 the game induced by N is a game structure. We only need to prove that for all
s, t ∈ W , and i ∈ I, V (s, i) = V (f(s), i), and that s ∼i t only if V (f(s), i) = V (f(t), i). Let s, t ∈ W , and
i ∈ I. Because f is an identity function, we have V (s, i) = V (f(s), i). Furthermore by (Ke) if s ∼i t, then
V (s, i) = V (t, i), which implies that V (f(s), i) = V (f(t), i). ✷
The following lemma is crucial to the later result which connects the two semantics.
Lemma 24 Let N = (W,∼,→, V ) be any normal epistemic temporal model, G = (W,R,O) be the game
induced by N , letM = 〈W,f,∼, V 〉 be the epistemic part induced by N . Then s
a
→ t in N only if
M⊗U , (s, a) ↔G M, t.
PROOF It is useful to note that for all w, u ∈ W and b ∈ A, w
b
→ u in N iff wRbu in G, which we will
use repeatedly in the following proof. By Lemma 21, and Lemma 23, G andM are game structures and
epistemic model w.r.t. G. Let s
a
→ t, letM⊗U = (W ′, f ′,∼′, V ′), and let Z be the binary relation between
M⊗U andM such that (w, b)Zu iff wRbu in G. Since s
a
→ t, we have sRat. It follows that Z is nonempty.
Let w, u ∈W and b ∈ A such that wRbu. We now check the three conditions of G-bisimulation bearing
in mind that O = V .
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For Inv. First we have f ′(w, b) = R(f(w), b). Since wRbu, R(w, b) = u, and because f is an identity
function, we have
f ′(w, b) = R(f(w), b) = R(w, b) = u = f(u).
For Zig. Suppose (w, b) ∼′i (w
′, b′) in M⊗ U for some i ∈ I. Let u′ be the state such that w′Rb′u
′.
By the definition of ∼′, we have w ∼i w
′, b !i b
′ and V (R(f(w), b), i) = V (R(f(w′), b′), i). Because
R(w, b) = u, R(w′, b′) = u′ and that f is an identity function, we can get that V (u, i) = V (u′, i). Hence
we have
w
b
→ u,w
b′
→ u′, w ∼i w
′, b!i b
′, V (u, i) = V (u′, i),
and then by (Nm), we obtain u ∼i u
′.
For Zag. Suppose u ∼i u
′ for some i ∈ I and u′ ∈ W . Then by (Ke) V (u, i) = V (u′, i). Furthermore,
by (Pr) there is a w′ ∈ W and a b′ ∈ A such that b !i b
′, w ∼i w
′ and w′
b′
→ u′. Because R(w, b) = u,
R(w′, b′) = u′ and f is an identity function, we can acquire that V (R(f(w), b), i) = V (R(f(w′), b′), i), and
then by the definition of ∼′ we have (w, b) ∼′i (w
′, b′).
ThereforeM⊗U , (s, a) andM, t are G-bisimilar. ✷
4.3 The equivalence of the two semantics
Now we are ready to establish the equivalence of the two semantics in two cases demonstrated by the
following two theorems: one between a normal epistemic temporal model and its induced epistemic
model, and another is between an epistemic model and its generated run model. It then follows that the
valid formulas w.r.t. these two semantics are the same.
Theorem 25 Let N = (W,∼,→, V ), let G = (S,R,O) be the game structure induced by N , let M =
〈W,f,∼, V 〉 be the epistemic model induced by N . Then for any LDEL formula φ and any s ∈W
N , s  φ⇐⇒M, s  φ.
PROOF We prove by induction on the structure of the formulas. The cases for Boolean combinations
and Kiφ are trivial due to Proposition 19 and the induction hypothesis.
For the case [a]φ. On one hand, N , s  [a]φ iff for each t ∈ W , s
a
→ t implies N , t  φ. On the other
hand M, s  [a]φ iff a ∈ e(f(w)) implies M⊗ U , (s, a)  φ. Moreover, because f is an identity function
and by Lemma 21, e(s) = Act(s), M, s  [a]φ is equivalent to that a ∈ Act(s) impliesM⊗ U , (s, a)  φ.
It remains to show that
for each t ∈W, s
a
→ t implies N , t  φ iff a ∈ Act(s) impliesM⊗U , (s, a)  φ. (1)
Observe that a /∈ Act(s) iff there is no t ∈W such that s
a
→ t. Suppose there is no t ∈W such that s
a
→ t.
Then a /∈ Act(s). It follows that both sides of the equivalence (1) vacuously hold, and hence (1) holds.
Suppose there is a t ∈W such that s
a
→ t. Then a ∈ Act(s). SinceN is normal, by (Det) t is the only state
such that s
a
→ t. By I.H., N , t  φ iffM, t  φ. Using Lemma 24, we obtain thatM⊗U , (s, a) ↔G M, t,
and by Lemma 18 LDEL formulas are invariant w.r.t. , we haveM, t  φ iffM⊗U , (s, a)  φ. Therefore
N , s  [a]φ iffM, s  [a]φ. ✷
Theorem 26 Let G be any game structure, M = (W,f,∼, V ) be any epistemic model, and F⊗(M) =
(W ′,∼′,→′, V ′) be the run model generated by repeatedly updating U . Then for each LDEL formula φ and
each w ∈W ,
M, w  φ iff F⊗(M), (w)  φ.
PROOF We proof by induction on the construction of φ, and we only show the case φ = [a]ψ. On one
hand, M, w  φ iff a ∈ e(f(w)) implies M⊗ U , (w, a)  ψ. On the other hand, F⊗(M), (w)  φ iff for
each v ∈ W ′, (w)
a
→ v implies F⊗(M), v  ψ, iff, by determinacy, (w)
a
→ v for some v ∈ W ′ implies
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F⊗(M), v  ψ. Thus we have to demonstrate that
a ∈ e(f(w)) impliesM⊗U , (w, a)  ψ iff (w)
a
→ v for some v ∈W ′
implies F⊗(M), v  ψ. (2)
Note that for each u ∈ W and b ∈ A, b ∈ e(f(u)) iff (u)
b
→ u′ for some u′ ∈ W ′. If a /∈ e(f(w)), then
there is no v ∈ W ′ such that (w)
a
→ v, which implies that both sides of the equivalence (2) are vacuously
true, and hence (2) holds.
Suppose a ∈ e(f(w)). Then (w)
a
→ v for some v ∈W ′, and clearly v = (w, a). It remains to show that
M⊗U , (w, a)  ψ iff F⊗(M), (w, a)  ψ.
We prove this by showing that F⊗(M⊗U) is a generated submodel of F⊗(M), and then using induction
hypothesis.
We claim that F⊗(M⊗ U) is the submodel of F⊗(M) generated from B = {(u, ai, . . . , ak) ∈ W
′ |
k = 1}. It is easy to check that it is indeed the case, and (w, a) ∈ B. As is well known in modal
logic that each state in generated submodel satisfies the same formula in original model. It follows that
F⊗(M), (w, a)  ψ iff F⊗(M⊗U), (w, a)  ψ, and this completes our proof. ✷
Based on the above theorems, we can establish the equivalence of the two semantics modulo validities,
which will play a crucial role in the later proof of the completeness of our proof system. Let C be the class
of normal epistemic temporal models.
Theorem 27 For each LDEL formula φ,  φ iff C  φ.
PROOF Suppose C 1 φ for some LDEL formula φ. Then there is an normal epistemic temporal model
N ∈ C such that N 1 φ. By Theorem 25 there is an epistemic modelM such thatM 2 φ. Hence 2 φ.
Suppose 2 φ. Then there is an epistemic modelM such thatM 2 φ. By Theorem 26 F⊗(M) 2 φ, and
hence using Proposition 9, F⊗(M) ∈ C. Therefore C 1 φ. ✷
These two semantics and their correspondence provide us two perspectives to understand our logic:
the constructive DEL-like perspective and the global ETL-like perspective. In the next section, we will see
that the connection of these two perspectives also play a technical role: we will use the correspondence
to give a complete axiomatization of our logic.
5 A complete axiomatization
In this section we give a complete axiomatization of the dynamic epistemic logic we proposed based on
game structures and player assumptions. Due to theorem 27, we only need to show that the proof system
is complete w.r.t. the  semantics over normal epistemic temporal models. Namely the same proof system
is complete for two different semantics. In fact, it is impossible to axiomatize our logic using the standard
reduction method for DEL: the action modality is clearly not reducible to the purely epistemic fragment.
The techniques we use are developed in Wang and Cao (2013); Wang and Aucher (2013).
Note that although our logical approach in this paper is mostly semantics-driven, a proof system with
intuitive axioms can help us to see clearly what we have assumed in our framework and to understand
our own work better.
5.1 A proof system SIG
Recall that we fix an observation model U . The following proof system also depends on the given U .
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System SIG
Axioms Rules
TAUT all the axioms of propositional logic MP
φ, φ→ ψ
ψ
DISTKi Ki(φ→ ψ)→ (Kiφ→ Kiψ) NECKi
φ
Kiφ
DIST[a] [a](φ→ ψ)→ ([a]φ→ [a]ψ) NEC[a]
φ
[a]φ
T Kiφ→ φ
4 Kiφ→ KiKiφ
5 ¬Kiφ→ Ki¬Kiφ
NM Kˆi〈b〉(φ ∧ φoi )→ [a](φ
o
i → Kˆiφ)) (if a!i b)
PR 〈a〉Kˆiφ→
∨
b:a!ib
Kˆi〈b〉φ
DET 〈a〉φ→ [a]φ
EXTURN TURNi →
∧
j 6=i ¬TURNj
INFO 〈a〉⊤ ↔ pai (if a ∈ Ai)
KE (pi → Kipi) ∧ (¬pi → Ki¬pi)
where a ranges over A, p, q range over P and in the clause of NM, φoi ranges over the following set of
formulas which exhausts every possible combination of information pieces for i (note that P is finite):
{(
∧
p∈B
pi) ∧ (
∧
p 6∈B
¬pi) | B ⊆ P}.
Therefore, NM is a finite schema. Since A is finite, PR is a finite schema. Note that if U consists of public
actions only (!i are all self-loops), then we can replace b with a in NM and PR. Moreover, the system is
clearly not closed under substitutions due to the special proposition letters.
Besides the ‘usual suspects’ for modal logic like DIST[a] and NEC[a], axiom schemata NM and PR state
two important properties about the players in our framework. Note that the general forms of the two
axioms are Kˆ〈·〉φ → [·]Kˆφ and 〈·〉Kˆφ → Kˆ〈·〉φ respectively, which can be massaged into 〈·〉Kφ → K[·]φ
and K[·]φ → [·]Kφ. Then they roughly say “if I know it now then I knew it would hold before the action”
(no miracles) and “if I expect to know then I will indeed know it after the action” (perfect recall). The
formulas φoi are used to control the condition under which no miracles can happen. Other axioms are
quite straightforward; DET says that the actions are deterministic; EXTURN says that each state can only
belong to one player; INFO gives the meaning to information pieces pai ; KE says that the players always
know the information given to them by the game.
It is not hard to establish the soundness of the system.
Theorem 28 (Soundness) The system SIG is sound w.r.t. .
PROOF We only show the cases for axioms DET, EXTURN, INFO, KE, NM and PR. Others are standard. Let
M = (W,f,∼, V ) be any epistemic model w.r.t. a game structure G, and let w ∈W .
For DET, ifM, w  〈a〉φ, then a ∈ e(f(w)) andM⊗U , (w, a)  φ, which impliesM, w  [a]φ.
For EXTURN. Recall that TURNi =
∨
a∈Ai
〈a〉⊤ for each ∈ I. SupposeM, w  TURNi. ThenM, w  〈a〉⊤
for some a ∈ Ai, which implies a ∈ e(f(w)). Using our requirement for RG in Definition 1, we have
b /∈ e(f(w)) for each b /∈ Ai. It follows thatM, w  ¬[b]⊤ for each b /∈ Ai. ThusM, w 
∧
j 6=i TURNj.
For INFO. For all i ∈ I and a ∈ Ai, M, w  〈a〉⊤ iff a ∈ e(f(w)) iff R(f(w), a) is defined, iff, by our
definition about OG in Definition 1, p
a ∈ OG(f(w), i) = V (w, i), iffM, w  p
a
i .
For KE. Let p ∈ P and i ∈ I. SupposeM, w  pi. Then p ∈ V (w, i) = OG(f(w), i). Consider any u ∈W
with w ∼i u. Using Definition 2, we have V (u, i) = OG(f(u), i) = OG(f(w), i), which implies p ∈ V (u, i),
i.e.,M, u  pi. It follows thatM, w  Kipi. Similarly we can prove thatM, w  ¬pi only ifM, w  Ki¬pi.
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For NM. Suppose M, w  Kˆi〈b〉(φ ∧ φ
o
i ) for some i ∈ I, some formula φ, φ
o
i and some b ∈ A. Then
there are u ∈ W and b ∈ A such that w ∼i u, b ∈ e(f(u)) and M⊗ U , (u, b)  φ ∧ φ
o
i . Recall that φ
o
i =
(
∧
p∈B pi)∧(
∧
p 6∈B ¬pi) for some B ⊆ P. Now consider any a ∈ Awith a!i b. If a /∈ e(f(w)), we vacuously
haveM, w  [a](φoi → Kˆiφ). If a ∈ e(f(w)) andM⊗N , (w, a)  φ
o
i , then usingM⊗U , (u, b)  φ
o
i ,
OG(R(f(w), a), i) = V ((w, a), i) = V ((u, b), i) = OG(R(f(u), b), i),
which implies, together with a ∈ e(f(w)) and w ∼i u, that (w, b) ∼
′
i (u, a), where ∼
′ is the epsitemic
relation inM⊗U . SinceM⊗U , (u, b)  φ, it follows thatM⊗U , (w, a)  Kˆiφ. ThereforeM⊗U , (w, a) 
φoi → Kˆiφ, and thenM, w  [a](φ
o
i → Kˆiφ).
For PR. SupposeM, w  〈a〉Kˆiφ for some a ∈ A, i ∈ I and some formula φ. ThenM⊗U , (w, a)  Kˆiφ,
and hence there are u ∈ W and b ∈ A such that b ∈ e(f(u)), (w, a) ∼′i (u, b) and M⊗ U , (u, b)  φ. It
follows that M, u  〈b〉φ. By definition 4, we have w ∼i u and a !i b. Thus M, w  Kˆi〈b〉φ, which
implies thatM, w 
∨
b:b!ia
Kˆi〈b〉φ. ✷
5.2 Completeness
For completeness, we use the strategy proposed in Wang and Cao (2013); Wang and Aucher (2013). The
idea is to turn the dynamics (updates) into transitions in a two dimensional Kripke model and use some
special properties to characterize the updates such that the dynamics can be flattened out under these
properties. The general strategy is as follows:
 φ =⇒ C  φ =⇒ ⊢SIG φ for each LDEL formula φ.
The hardest part (the first step) has been solved in Theorem 27. In the following we prove the second
step, namely the completeness w.r.t. the normal epistemic temporal models under .5
We use Γ,Λ . . . for sets of LDEL formulas. As usual, we say a set of LDEL formulas Γ is maximally
consistent if it is SIG-consistent, and any set properly containing Γ is SIG-inconsistent.
Definition 29 (Cononical model) A canonical model NC is a structure
(WC , {≃i| i ∈ I}, {
a
֌| a ∈ A}, V C)
where
• WC is the set of all maximally consistent sets;
• for all w, u ∈WC and i ∈ I, w ≃i u iff {φ | Kiφ ∈ w} ⊆ {φ | φ ∈ u};
• for all w, u ∈WC and a ∈ A,w
a
֌ u iff {φ | [a]φ ∈ w} ⊆ {φ | φ ∈ u};
• for all w ∈WC , i ∈ I and p ∈ P, w ∈ V C(p, i) iff pi ∈ w.
The following are routine exercises for normal modal logic (cf. e.g., Blackburn et al. (2002)).
Lemma 30 Let NC = (WC ,≃,֌, V C) be a canonical model. Then for all w, u ∈WC , i ∈ I and a ∈ A:
• w ≃i u iff {φ | φ ∈ u} ⊆ {φ | Kˆiφ ∈ w};
• ≃i is an equivalence relation for each i ∈ I;
• w
a
֌ u iff {φ | φ ∈ u} ⊆ {φ | 〈a〉φ ∈ w};
• (truth lemma) for each LDEL formula φ, NC , w  φ iff φ ∈ w.
5It is not that hard to see that the completeness should work in principle, based on the Sahlqvist completeness theorem: the
axioms are mostly Sahlqvist formulas with a few exceptions which are not closed under substitution (they specify properties of
the models rather than frames). We will spell out the details in a proof based on the canonical model.
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The only missing part is to show that the canonical model is indeed a normal epistemic temporal
model w.r.t. U .
Lemma 31 Given U , the canonical model NC = (WC ,≃,֌, V C) is a normal epistemic temporal model.
PROOF We only show that NC satisfies the condition (Det), (Exturn), (Info), (Ke), (Nm) and (Pr). Let
w, u, v ∈WC , i ∈ I and a ∈ A.
For (Det), suppose w
a
֌ u, u
a
֌ v, and u 6= v. Then there is a φ ∈ u such that ¬φ ∈ v, which implies
〈a〉φ∧〈a〉¬φ ∈ w. However, this is impossible, because by axiom DET, 〈a〉φ→ [a]φ ∈ w, and then [a]φ ∈ w,
a contradiction.
For (Exturn), suppose Act(w) 6= ∅. Then there is a j ∈ I and a b ∈ Aj such that b ∈ Act(w), which
implies 〈b〉⊤ ∈ w. Recall that TURNi =
∨
c∈Ai
〈c〉⊤, and hence ⊢ 〈b〉⊤ → TURNj. It follows, by axiom
EXTURN, that
∧
k 6=j ¬TURNk ∈ w, i.e., ¬〈c〉⊤ ∈ w for each c ∈ A such that c /∈ Actj . Thus Act(w) ⊆ Aj .
For (Info), consider any b ∈ Ai. p
b ∈ V C(w, i) iff pbi ∈ w iff, by axiom INFO, 〈b〉⊤ ∈ w iff w
b
֌ u′ for
some u′ ∈WC .
For (Ke), suppose w ≃i u and V
C(w, i) 6= V C(u, i). Then V C(w, i) and V C(u, i) do not contain all the
same information pieces. Without losing any generality suppose there is a p ∈ P such that p ∈ V C(w, i)
but p /∈ V C(u, i). Then pi ∈ w and pi /∈ u. Using axiom KE we have pi → Kpi ∈ w, which implies Kpi ∈ w.
Since w ≃i u, we can obtain that pi ∈ u, a contradiction!
For (Nm), suppose w ≃i u and u
a
֌ v. Let B ⊆ P be the set of information pieces such that p ∈ B iff
pi ∈ v, and let
ψ = (
∧
p∈B
pi) ∧ (
∧
p/∈B
¬pi).
Then ψ ∈ v. We can check that for each s ∈WC , ψ ∈ s iff V C(s, i) = V C(v, i). Now consider any s ∈WC
and b ∈ A such that w
b
֌ s,a!i b and V
C(s, i) = V C(v, i), and then ψ ∈ s. We claim that
{φ | φ ∈ v} ⊆ {φ | Kˆiφ ∈ s} (2)
and hence s ≃i v. Suppose φ ∈ v. Then 〈a〉(φ∧ψ) ∈ u, which implies Kˆi〈a〉(φ∧ψ) ∈ w. By axiom NM and
a!i b, we have [b](ψ → Kˆiφ) ∈ w, and because w
b
֌ s, we can get that (ψ → Kˆiφ) ∈ s. Since ψ ∈ s, we
obtain Kˆiφ ∈ s. Therefore (2) holds, and this completes our proof for (Nm).
For (Pr), suppose w
a
֌ u and u ≃i v. Let Γ = {φ | Kiφ ∈ w}, and for each b ∈ A, let Λb = {〈b〉φ | φ ∈
v}. We show that
there is a b ∈ A such that b!i a and Γ ∪ Λb is SIG-consistent. (3)
Note that by axiom DET, for each finite sequence of formulas φ1, φ2, . . . , φn and each b ∈ A,
⊢ 〈b〉φ1 ∧ 〈b〉φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ 〈b〉φn ↔ 〈b〉(φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn).
Hence for each b ∈ A, if Γ ∪ Λb is SIG-inconsistent, then there are formulas ψ and φ such that ψ ∈ Γ,
〈b〉φ ∈ Λb and ⊢ 〈b〉φ→ ¬ψ. For each b ∈ A, if Γ∪Λb is SIG-inconsistent, then let ψb and φb be such ψ and
φ. Suppose towards contradiction that for each b ∈ A, b!i a only if Γ ∪ Λb is SIG-inconsistent. Because
〈b〉φb ∈ Λb for each b with b!i a, and by the definition of Λb, we have φb ∈ v for each b!i a. Then
for each c with c!i a, 〈c〉λ ∈ Λc and ⊢ 〈c〉λ→ 〈c〉φc, where λ =
∧
b:b!ia
φb.
Since ⊢ 〈b〉φb → ¬ψb for each b with b!i a, it follows that
⊢
∧
b:b!ia
(〈b〉λ→ ¬χ) where χ =
∧
b:b!ia
ψb. (4)
Note that by the our assumption about Γ, χ ∈ Γ. Since λ ∈ v, w
a
֌ u and u ≃i v, we have 〈a〉Kˆiλ ∈ w,
which implies, by axiom PR,
∨
b:b!ia
Kˆi〈b〉λ ∈ w. By (4) we have
∧
b:b!ia
Ki(〈b〉λ → ¬χ) ∈ w, and then
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Kˆi¬χ ∈ w, but this is impossible, for χ ∈ Γ, i.e., Kiχ ∈ w. Therefore (3) holds for some b, and hence
there is a maximally consistent set Λ such that Γ ∪ Λb ⊆ Λ, which implies w ≃i Λ and Λ
b
֌ v. ✷
Theorem 32 SIG is sound and complete w.r.t. 〈LDEL,C,〉.
PROOF Using Theorem 28 and Corollary 27, we have the soundness of SIG. By Lemmas 30 and 31 we
obtain that SIG is complete. ✷
From Theorem 28, Corollary 27 and Theorem 32 it follows:
Theorem 33 SIG is sound and complete w.r.t. 〈LDEL,M,〉 where M is the collection all the epistemic
models.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we present an attempt to formally separate the game rules from the game runs, and to
compute the latter from the earlier with extra assumptions of the players in terms of initial uncertainty,
observability and knowledge update mechanism. In this way we can explicitly specify what information
is given by the game and what information is obtained by the players during the plays, thus clarifying
different interpretations of information sets in imperfect information games. We show that under certain
(strong) conditions on the game structures, the distinction of game rules and runs is negligible, thus
also explaining why it is sometimes harmless to mix the two in practice. We propose a logic to reason
about game runs under two equivalent semantics based on the ideas of DEL and ETL respectively. We also
give a complete axiomatization of the logic to syntactically capture the assumptions that we made in the
framework.
As we mentioned in the introduction, our work is related to the GDL-II language proposed by Schiffel and Thielscher
(2014), which deserves a more detailed comparison since not much has been said connecting GDL with
dynamic epistemic logic. GDL-II is a simple yet elegant language of specifying game rules with imperfect
information. GDL-II is given a semantics to compute the corresponding game runs with uncertainty in a
very similar way to the update product in this paper. In GDL-II, a player i cannot distinguish two histories
h and h′ if i sees (a special predicate) exactly the same information provided by the game along h and
h′ and the local actions in h and h′ for i are the same.6 Under synchronicity, the indistinguishability at
the next stage of the game runs only depends on the indistinguishability at the previous stage and the
local actions, which implicitly assumes (variants of) perfect recall and no miracles. On the other hand,
GDL-II does not distinguish the assumptions about the players and the information provided by the game
and assume a unique starting state which is common knowledge. The initial uncertainty and the obser-
vational power of the players are encoded by game information and random moves. GDL-II models can
be translated to various epistemic temporal models Ruan and Thielscher (2014); Huang et al. (2013);
Ruan and Thielscher (2012) where epistemic temporal languages can be used to talk about the properties
of the games.
Although our approach employs specific designs about each component of the game and the player
assumptions, e.g., the update product ⊗ which presupposes synchronous perfect recall, we hope the
readers can see the flexibility for our work to be adapted with the following features:
• update mechanisms without perfect recall such as the ones discussed by van Benthem (2014);
• explicit memory components in the epistemic models such as the sequences of actions or inform-
ation pieces in Kaneko and Kline (2008). Note that in our work the memory ability is implicitly
characterized by the update mechanism thus to incorporate the more general memory components
we need to revise the update mechanism accordingly with explicit memory checking;
6GDL-II allows concurrent actions where a global transition in game is induced by a tuple of local moves.
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• the expected strategies to capture the rationality of the players, in order to strengthen the reasoning
power of the players. The strategies may be encoded as well in the epistemic models similar to the
local states with strategies in Halpern (1997);
• observation models with higher-order uncertainty, e.g., player 1 is sure what happened but he is not
sure whether player 2 knows it. It can be handled by copies of the same action with the help of a
function from the ‘action copies’ in the observation model to actions in A, just like the function f in
the epistemic model w.r.t. a game;
• a logical language with ATL-like operators such as the ones used by Goranko and Hawke (2010)
based on CIGS.
• a model checking algorithm based on game rules directly, like the one for a similar language in the
setting of epistemic planning Yu et al. (2015). We do not need to compute the complete run model
in order to check the truth value of the LDEL formulas. However, if we strengthen the expressive
power of the language with iteration or fixed point operators the model checking problem may
become highly non-trivial (cf. e.g., Aucher and Bolander (2013)).
With some of those extensions in place, we may be able to discuss (new) solution concepts as explored in
the interpreted system framework with knowledge-based programs by Halpern and Moses (2007).
Of course, there are many interesting problems to be discussed further. For example, although we
try to separate the game rules from the player assumptions, sometimes the distinction is rather blurred.
For example, game rules may also include assumptions about the observability of the players (e.g., they
should not see others’ cards), which can be encoded by the game information in our framework. Should
we make them more explicit in the rules? Moreover, sometimes the initial uncertainty is caused by the
game rules (e.g., drawing the cards from a shuffled deck), should we include it in the game rules instead
of the player assumptions? Moreover, in our framework, each player gets some information even on
the states which do not belong to him or her. However, does this extra information for the ‘currently
irrelevant’ players really play a role for reasonable solutions of the game?
We close with a more technical question which we also leave for a future occasion: is our run model
always regular modulo epistemic bisimulation? In the other words, will the computation of the next level
start to cycle at some point? It is not the case in DEL in general, but our model and update are quite
restricted which may give us some hope on the regularity of the computation.
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